

# Comment on “Quantum key distribution for $d$ -level systems with generalized Bell states” [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)]

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In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331(2002)], an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for  $d$ -level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.

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In the paper [1], V. Kariminpour *et al.* presented a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol for  $d$ -level systems based on shared entanglement of a reusable Bell state. The security against some individual attacks is proved, where the information gain of Eve is zero and the QBER introduced by her intervention is  $(d-1)/d$ . However, in this paper we will show that, by a special attack strategy Eve can get about half of the key dits without being detected by Alice and Bob.

For convenience, we use the same notations as in Ref.[1]. Let us give a brief description of the QKD protocol firstly (see Fig. 1). At the beginning, Alice and Bob share a generalized Bell state

$$|\Psi_{00}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j\rangle_{a,b}. \quad (1)$$

Denote the  $i$ -th key dit to be sent by  $q_i$ , which is encoded as a basis state  $|q_i\rangle_k$ . To send the key dit  $q_i$  to Bob, Alice performs a controlled-right shift on  $|q_i\rangle_k$  and thus entangles this qudit to the previously shared Bell state. Then she transmits this qudit to Bob, from which Bob can obtain the key dit  $q_i$  by performing a controlled-left shift and a measurement on it. Because every sending qudit is in a completely mixed state, Eve can not extract information about the key. Furthermore, to strengthen the security of this protocol, Alice and Bob perform  $H \otimes H^*$  on their Bell states before encrypt each  $|q_i\rangle_k$ .

We will describe Eve's strategy separately for each qudit. Hereafter we use the term “the  $i$ -th round” to denote




FIG. 1: The QKD protocol. Note that in this Comment, for simplicity, the operation  $H \otimes H^*$  or  $H \otimes H^* \otimes H$  is not included in our figures.




FIG. 2: Eve's attack in the first round.

the processing procedures of the  $i$ -th qudit, and Alice and Bob's operation  $H \otimes H^*$  is taken as the beginning of each round. In addition, we use  $|\psi_{i0}\rangle_{a,b,e}$  and  $|\psi_{i1}\rangle_{a,b,e}$  to denote the states shared by Alice, Bob and Eve in the beginning and the end of the  $i$ -th round, respectively. Suppose Eve prepares  $|0\rangle$  as her ancilla, the eavesdropping strategy can be described as follows:

(i) In the first round, Eve entangles her ancilla into the Bell state shared by Alice and Bob. More specifically, Eve intercepts the sending qudit and performs a controlled-right shift on her ancilla, then resends the sending qudit to Bob (see Fig. 2). The initial state of Alice, Bob and Eve's particles can be represented as

$$|\psi_{10}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, 0\rangle_{a,b,k,e}. \quad (2)$$

Then the states at various stages in Fig. 2 are as follows:

$$|\Phi_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, q_1, 0\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (3)$$

$$|\Phi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_1, 0\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (4)$$

$$|\Phi_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_1, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (5)$$




FIG. 3: Eve's attack in the second round.

$$|\Phi_3\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, q_1, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}. \quad (6)$$

In the last stage, when Bob performs his controlled-left shift, he disentangles the key qudit  $|q_1\rangle_k$  and correctly gets the value of  $q_1$ , while the original Bell state has now been entangled with the state of Eve in the form of

$$|\psi_{11}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (7)$$

(ii) In the second round, Eve tries to avoid the detection and, at the same time, retain her entanglement with Alice and Bob. As was proved in Ref.[1], Eve can not obtain information in this round. However, we will show that she can take some measures to avoid the detection.

Firstly, when Alice and Bob perform the operations  $H \otimes H^*$  on their “Bell state”, Eve also performs  $H$  on her ancilla. As a result, the entangled state of Alice, Bob and Eve will be converted into

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_{20}\rangle_{a,b,e} &= H \otimes H^* \otimes H |\psi_{11}\rangle_{a,b,e} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} H \otimes H^* \otimes H |j, j, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,e} \\ &= \frac{1}{d^2} \sum_{j,k,l,m=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{jk-jl+m(j+q_1)} |k, l, m\rangle_{a,b,e} \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Summing over  $j$  and using the identity  $\frac{1}{d} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{jn} = \delta(n, 0)$ , we finally arrive at

$$|\psi_{20}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l - k\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (9)$$

Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qudit, performs a controlled-right shift on it, and then resends it to Bob (see Fig. 3). The states at various stages in Fig. 3 are as follows:

$$|\Psi_0\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, q_2, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (10)$$




FIG. 4: Eve's attack in the third round.

$$|\Psi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, k + q_2, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (11)$$

$$|\Psi_2\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l + q_2, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (12)$$

$$|\Psi_3\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, q_2, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}. \quad (13)$$

In the last stage, when Bob performs his controlled-left shift, he disentangles the key qudit  $|q_2\rangle_k$  and correctly gets the value of  $q_2$ , while leaving the state

$$|\psi_{21}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l - k\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (14)$$

(iii) In the third round, Eve eavesdrops the key qudit. Firstly, as in step.(ii), Eve also performs  $H$  on her ancilla when Alice and Bob perform  $H$  and  $H^*$  on their respective particles. The entangled state will be changed into

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_{30}\rangle_{a,b,e} &= H \otimes H^* \otimes H |\psi_{21}\rangle_{a,b,e} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,e}. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qudit, performs a controlled-left shift, a measurement and a controlled-right shift on it, and then resends it to Bob (see Fig. 4). The states at various stages in Fig. 4 are as follows:

$$|\Omega_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, q_3, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (16)$$

$$|\Omega_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, m + q_3, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (17)$$

$$|\Omega_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, q_3 + q_1, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (18)$$

$$|\Omega_3\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, m + q_3, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (19)$$

$$|\Omega_4\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, q_3, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}. \quad (20)$$

It can be seen that Eve disentangles the key qudit by a controlled-left shift, performs a measurement, and then restores the entangled state by a controlled-right shift. As a result, Eve obtains the measurement result  $q_3 + q_1$  and Bob correctly gets the value of  $q_3$ . At last, the entangled state of Alice, Bob and Eve can be written as

$$|\psi_{31}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{m=0}^{d-1} |m, m, m - q_1\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (21)$$

(iv) In the fourth round, Eve uses the same strategy as in the second round to avoid the detection, that is, the strategy in step.(ii). After their operation  $H \otimes H^* \otimes H$ , Alice, Bob and Eve change the entangled state into

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_{40}\rangle_{a,b,e} &= H \otimes H^* \otimes H |\psi_{31}\rangle_{a,b,e} \\ &= \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l - k\rangle_{a,b,e}. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Then Eve performs the operations as described in Fig. 3. The states at various stages are as follows:

$$|\Theta_0\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, q_4, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (23)$$

$$|\Theta_1\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, k + q_4, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (24)$$

$$|\Theta_2\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l + q_4, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (25)$$

$$|\Theta_3\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, q_4, l - k\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (26)$$

where  $\Theta_p$  corresponds to the state  $\Psi_p$  in Fig. 3 ( $p = 0, 1, 2, 3$ ).

It can be seen that, in the last stage, Bob correctly gets the value of  $q_4$ , while leaving the state

$$|\psi_{41}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{k,l=0}^{d-1} \zeta^{-q_1(l-k)} |k, l, l - k\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (27)$$

(v) In the fifth round, Eve uses the same strategy as in the third round to eavesdrop the key qudit, that is, the strategy in step.(iii). After their operation  $H \otimes H^* \otimes H$ , Alice, Bob and Eve change the entangled state into

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_{50}\rangle_{a,b,e} &= H \otimes H^* \otimes H |\psi_{41}\rangle_{a,b,e} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,e}. \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

Then Eve performs the operations as described in Fig. 4. The states at various stages are as follows:

$$|\Upsilon_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, q_5, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (29)$$

$$|\Upsilon_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_5, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (30)$$

$$|\Upsilon_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, q_5 - q_1, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (31)$$

$$|\Upsilon_3\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_5, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (32)$$

$$|\Upsilon_4\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, q_5, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,k,e}, \quad (33)$$

where  $\Upsilon_p$  corresponds to the state  $\Omega_p$  in Fig. 4 ( $p = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4$ ). It can be seen that Eve's measurement result in this round is  $q_5 - q_1$ .

Obviously, in the last stage, Bob correctly gets the value of  $q_5$ , while leaving the state

$$|\psi_{51}\rangle_{a,b,e} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} |j, j, j + q_1\rangle_{a,b,e}. \quad (34)$$

Note that  $|\psi_{51}\rangle_{a,b,e} = |\psi_{11}\rangle_{a,b,e}$ . Therefore, in the following rounds, Eve can use the same strategy as in the steps from (ii) to (v) repeatedly until the last key dit were transmitted.

Now let us give a concretely description of our eavesdropping strategy:

1. In the first round, Eve performs the operations as described in Fig. 2;
2. When Alice and Bob perform  $H$  and  $H^*$  on their respective particles at the beginning of every round (except for the first round), Eve also performs  $H$  on her ancilla;
3. In every even round, Eve performs the operations as described in Fig. 3;
4. In every odd round (except for the first round), Eve performs the operations as described in Fig. 4.

From the above analysis, we can see that in our eavesdropping strategy no error will be introduced to the key distribution between Alice and Bob, and Eve will obtain exactly the result of

$$q_3 + q_1, q_5 - q_1, q_7 + q_1, q_9 - q_1, \dots$$

from which she can infer about half of the key dits by checking  $d$  possible values for  $q_1$ . It should be emphasized that there is another profitable fact for Eve. That is, at the end of QKD procedure, Alice and Bob will

compare a subsequence of the key dits publicly to detect eavesdropping, which will leak useful information to Eve. More specifically, as long as any odd numbered key dit is announced, Eve can determine which of the  $d$  possible results is true.

In conclusion, though Eve cannot get information about the key dit in every even rounds (as proved in Ref.[1]), she can take some more clever measures to avoid the detection and retain her entanglement with Alice and Bob, so that she can eavesdrop the key dit in the next round. Our attack strategy is exactly based on this fact.

By our strategy Eve can obtain about half of the key dits without being detected by Alice and Bob. Consequently the QKD protocol in Ref.[1] is insecure against this type of attack.

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